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From jaromil <jaromil@dyne.org>
Date Thu, 22 Apr 2004 11:58:30 +0200
Subject Re: [hackmeeting] si e' rotto il TCP 

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On Thu, Apr 22, 2004 at 11:26:55AM +0200, jaromil wrote:
> 
>  Serious TCP/IP vuln exposed
> 
> The UK's National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre yesterday
> reported a fundamental flaw with the core Internet protocol - TCP/IP - which
> creates a mechanism for hackers to crash vulnerable routers and severely
> disrupt Internet traffic.
> 
> 11:04  <kysucix> http://www.securityfocus.com/news/8499

+info su http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm

The vulnerability described in this advisory affects implementations of the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) that comply with the Internet Engineering
Task Force's (IETF's) Requests For Comments (RFCs) for TCP, including RFC 793,
the original specification, and RFC 1323, TCP Extensions for High Performance.

[...]

The impact of this vulnerability varies by vendor and application, but in some
deployment scenarios it is rated critical. Please see the vendor section below
for further information. Alternatively contact your vendor for product specific
information.

[...]

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is judged to be potentially most affected by
this vulnerability.
BGP relies on a persistent TCP session between BGP peers. Resetting the
connection can result in medium term unavailability due to the need to rebuild
routing tables and route flapping.  Route flapping may result in route
dampening (suppression) if the route flaps occur frequently within a short time
interval.  The overall impact on BGP is likely to be moderate based on the
likelihood of successful attack. If the TCP MD5 Signature Option and
anti-spoofing measures are used then the impact will be low as these measures
will successfully mitigate the vulnerability.

There is a potential impact on other application protocols such as DNS (Domain
Name System) and SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) in the case of zone transfers and
ecommerce transactions respectively, but the duration of the sessions is
relatively short and the sessions can be restarted without medium term
unavailability problems. In the case of SSL it may be difficult to guess the
source IP address.

> stika.

a me pare una cosa seria.


- -- 
 jaromil,  dyne.org rasta coder,  http://rastasoft.org

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